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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
-v-
STEPHEN JOHN KALISZ 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 860032 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgement and conviction against 
Stephen John Kalisz for Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the First 
Degree under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953 as amended). A jury 
found the Appellant guilty following a trial held November 14 and 
15, 1985, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 17, 1985, at approximately 2:30 p.m., Appellants 
John R. Remington, a dark-haired caucasion of medium-dark 
complexion^ and another individual, possibly Stephen J. Kalisz, a 
blond caucasion with a light complexion, arrived at Steve's Auto 
Sales which is located at 860 South Main Street in Salt Lake City 
(R.164-166). Remington requested that he be allowed to test drive a 
black 1978 Monte Carlo. (R.167). 
Remington was allowed to test the vehicle without being ask^d for 
identification (R.177). While the two men tested the Monte Carlo 
they left their unlocked truck with the owner of the car lot, Steve 
Argyle (R.167). 
After approximately 45 minutes, Mr. Argyle became concerned 
that Mr. Remington had not returned with the Monte Carlo (R.163). 
Argyle began a search of the truck they arrived in and discovered a 
prison gate pass belonging to Mr. Remington (R.169,180). He then 
called the State Prison and the Salt Lake Police (R.169). 
Officer James E. Faraone of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department responded to the call for assistance (R.273). After 
listening to Argyle's story, the men together searched the truck, 
but could find no informative or incriminating evidence (R.290). 
Officer Faraone then called in the license number of the truck 
(R.171). Shortly thereafter Mr. Kalisz returned with the Monte 
Carlo (R.167,171,173,278). 
While the car's owner suspected the window stickers had 
been moved (R.172-3); the car was in good condition (R.192). Since 
Argyle had not checked the gas level or odometer reading before the 
test drive, there was no way of knowing where the car had been 
(R.180-81). Kalisz was searched and even though no incriminating 
evidence was discovered, he was detained by the police (R.174). 
Later that evening, at approximately 7:45 p.m., Martin A. 
Kaufman, a corrections supervisor at the State Prison, detained Mr. 
Remii.gton as he re-entered the prison. Remington was searched and 
was found with only a watch, keys, keyring, and lighter (R.306). 
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The corrections officer testified at trial that he was unaware of 
what Remington had in his possession when he left the prison that 
morning. (R.311). 
The record reveals that at approximately 5:20 p.m.* shortly 
before Mr. Kalisz returned the Monte Carlo, a single, armed gunman 
entered Cruser Jewelry, located in the Brickyard Plaza in Salt Lake 
City (R.227). The gunman ordered 78-year-old Reed Cruser, owner of 
the store, into the bathroom and onto the floor (R.227). The 
perpetrator then took a large black garbage bag and stole most of 
the jewelry from the store (R.227). 
The record reveals that Mr. Cruser had only a few minutes 
with which to view the gunman (R.236). In fact, Cruser's view was 
generally obstructed due to his position on the floor (R.236-37). 
Cruser gave the police a general description of the gunman, noting 
that he had "light" colored hair and a mustache (R.238-39). 
Suspecting the caucasion Appellant Kalisz in the robbery, police 
took Mr. Cruser to view the suspect soon after the crime (R.244). 
Mr. Cruser failed to recognize Mr. Kalisz (R.283-84). 
Mr. Remington and Mr. Kalisz were charged by information 
with Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony. (See Addendum A) 
(R.20-1). Mr. Remington was also charged with being in Possession 
of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person and with being a 
Habitual Criminal. 
At the preliminary hearing, Reed Cruser described the 
circumstances surrounding the robbery of his jewelry store (See 
Addendum B). After giving a description of the unknown gunman, 
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Cruser then proceeded to identify defense co-counsel, Manny Garcia, 
as the robber (See Addendum C, R.208,253). 
At trial the State presented testimony from the used car 
lot owner and from Mr. Cruser (R.164,222). Salt Lake Police 
Officers conceded that even though the gunman was not wearing gloves 
(R.241) they were unable to obtain any fingerprints belonging to 
either defendant (R.328-30). A search of Kalisz revealed no stolen 
jewelry (R.296-302) nor was any incriminating evidence discovered in 
a search of his home (R.300). Officers also conceded that no stolen 
jewelry was found in the Monte Carlo (R.302), nor was the State ever 
able to present any witness who saw the Monte Carlo or Mr. Kalisz at 
the crime scene (Closing Transcript at 33-4). In fact, the only 
evidence placing either Remington or Kalisz at the Cruser Jewelry 
Store was the testimony of the 78-year-old owner who mistakingly 
selected co-counsel Manny Garcia as the unidentified robber. 
Following the trial to the jury, both Appellants were found 
guilty of Aggravated Robbery (R.374), and Mr. Remington was 
subsequently guilty of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a 
Restricted Person (R.374) and of being a Habitual Criminal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellant, Stephen J. Kalisz, first contends that the 
trial court erred in refusing to give a requested instruction on 
eyewitness identification. In light of the tenuous identification 
by Mr. Cruser, the court abused its discretion in refusing such an 
instruction. 
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The Appellant* also argues that the evidence presented was 
insufficient to sustain his conviction. The evidence was not only 
inconclusive, but it failed to implicate either man as committing 
the robbery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO GIVE THE APPELLANT INSTRUCTION 
CONCERNING IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY. 
At the close of the defense, counsel for the Appellants 
submitted a requested jury instruction on the reliability of 
eyewitness identification presented at trial (See Addendum D) 
(R.65-66). The instruction was justified because the 
misidentifications made by Reed Cruser rendered his testimony 
questionable. Since the eyewitness identifications compromised 
almost all the proof given by the State against the defendants, the 
defense argued that the instruction was crucial. (R.65-66). The 
trial court denied the requested instruction (R.66). 
This Court in State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) and 
State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618 (Utah 1969) held that a defendant in 
a criminal case is entitled to have the jury instructed on his 
theory of the crime if there is any basis in the evidence to support 
that theory. As noted in State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980), 
the defendant's entitlement to a particular jury instruction is not 
absolute. Rather, it is conditioned upon the existence of evidence 
supporting a theory before the instruction is warranted. Where a 
defendant has asserted a defense to justify or excuse a criminal 
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charge and where there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to 
support it, viability of the defense then becomes a question of fact 
and the jury should be charged regarding it. State v. Harding, 635 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1981). In instances where the refusal of a requested 
instruction results in a compromise of the defendant's presumption 
of innocence, the refusal is considered prejudicial. United States 
v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1979)> United States v. Telfaire, 
469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
Initially, the Appellant concedes that there is no 
constitutional right or other requirement which presently exists 
« 
that mandates a trial court to instruct juries on the inherent 
fallibility of eyewitness identification in all cases. In fact, 
this Court in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982), left the 
decision of whether or not to read the Telfaire-type instruction to 
the jury in the discretion of the trial court.. See also: State v. 
Mcclain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985)* State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39 
(Utah 1984); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1984). 
However, showing greater sensitivity to problems inherent 
in eyewitness identification, this Court abandoned the discretionary 
standard in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). There the 
Court noted the dangers in eyewitness identifications, concluding: 
We therefore today abandon our discretionary 
approach to cautionary jury instructions and 
direct that in cases tried from this date 
forward, trial courts shall give such an 
instruction whenever eyewitness identification is 
a central issue in a case and such an instruction 
is requested by the defense. Given the great 
weight jurors are likely to give eyewitness 
testimony, and the deep and generally unperceived 
flaws in it, to convict a defendant on such 
evidence without advising the jury of the factors 
that should be considered in evaluating it could 
well deny the defendant due process of law under 
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Id. at 492. 
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In fact, even before this Court's decision in Long, courts 
across the country called for cautionary instructions regarding 
eyewitness identifications. As the court noted in United States v. 
Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 552: 
The presumption of innocence that safeguards the 
common law system must be a premise that is 
realized in instruction and not merely a 
promise. In pursuance of that objective, we have 
pointed out the importance of and need for 
special instruction on the key issue of 
identification, which emphasizes to the jury the 
need for finding that the circumstances of the 
identification are convincing beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
While courts are divided as to whether to require the 
Telfaire-type instruction, movement clearly seems to be toward the 
giving of the instruction. Both the Seventh and Fourth Circuits 
have strongly recommended' the use of Telfaire instructions in cases 
where identification is a key issue. See United States v. Hodges, 
515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 
(4th Cir. 1974). Approval of the instruction has been made in 
numerous states, including Utah, under certain conditions. See 
State v. Malmrose, supra? State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236 (Kansas 
1981); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d 889 (Mass. 1979); State 
v. Benjamin, 363 A.2d 726 (Conn. Supp. 1976); State v. Calica, 514 
P.2d 1354 (Or. App. 1973), cert, denied, 417 U.S.^917 (1974). 
In Utah, support for giving a Telfaire instruction has even 
been advanced by the State in oral arguments before this Court in 
State v. Quevedo, Utah Supreme Court Jo. 19049 (argued November 14, 
1985), and in State v. Jonas, Utah Supreme Court No. 20184 (argued 
November 15, 1985). As the State noted in Quevedo: 
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"If the State's case is based primarily on 
eyewitness identification testimony, then in most 
cases a Telfaire-type instruction should be 
given." Quevedo, Oral Argument (11/14/86). 
In fact, the State in Jonas actually encouraged this Court to adopt 
a standard mandating the instruction be given in appropriate cases, 
noting: 
"A standard which would require the giving of a 
Telfaire-type of instruction in cases which are 
primarily based upon eyewitness identification 
would be a clear guide to the trial court and a 
clear guide to the State and to defense counsel 
as to when these types of instructions were 
appropriate." 
Jonas, Or^l Argument (11/15/86). The State indicated in Jonas that 
its position was changed because of the number of appeals generated 
by this Court's current discretionary review standards and because 
"[T]he literature on this'subject weighs in favor of this type of 
instruction and can really only help the truth finding process in a 
criminal case." Id. 
This Court, in spite of the confusion over when to give the 
Telfaire instruction, has on numerous occasions found error in a 
trial court's refusal to give the instruction but upheld convictions 
on other grounds. See State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1984) (No 
error when witness had ample time to view suspect under ideal 
conditions)? State v. Watson, supra, (No error when instruction 
particularly addressed weaknesses which defendant raised in trial)j 
State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984) (No error since requested 
instruction adequately covered in other instructions); State v. 
Malmrose, supra. (No error where defense counsel failed to take 
exception to the trial court's refusal to give the instruction). 
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Under the facts of this case, however, the Court is presented with a 
situation in which the trial court abused its discretion by refusing 
to give the Telfaire-type instruction which is now mandated by 
Long, 
At the close of the case there was virtually no evidence 
presented by the State other than the identifications made by Mr. 
Cruser which placed either Mr. Remington or Mr. Kalisz at the crime 
scene. There were no photographs, no fingerprints, no other 
customers or eyewitnesses observing the unknown robber entering or 
leaving tehe store. (R.241,290,300,302,328-30). The gun alleged to 
have been used by the robber was also not presented at trial. 
The eyewitness identification of Reed Cruser can only be 
characterized as confusing Mr. Cruser, the victim of the robbery, 
gave a general description of the robber to police immediately after 
the crime which included the fact that the robber had light-colored 
hair (R.226,239). Shortly after the robbery, Mr. Cruser was taken 
to Steve's Auto Sales to view Stephen Kalisz to see if Kalisz could 
be identified as the perpetrator. At trial Cruser testified that he 
did identify Mr. Kalisz as the robber at the car lot 
(R.244,245,247). However, a police officer who was present at this 
show-up stated that Cruser did not identify Mr. Kalisz 
(R.283,284,289,290). A few days after the robbery, Mr. Cruser was 
shown a photo spread by police. From the photo spread, Mr. Cruser 
selected a picture of John Remington and identified him as the 
person who robbed his store (R.326). At trial Cruser reaffirmed 
that the man in the picture (Remington) was the robber, (R.228-229); 
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however, when asked to make an in-court identification of the 
robber, Cruser apparently identified Mr. Kalisz (R.202, 
246,247,248,278). Indeed, at the preliminary hearing, Cruser was 
not able to identify either defendant and identified only court 
personnel (R.208,253,259,271). In fact perhaps all of Mr. Cruser's 
identification testimony can best be summarized by his admission at 
one point that he was uncertain as to the robber's identity 
(R.246). 
Given the obvious conflicts with the testimony of the 
State's key witness coupled with that person's age and partially 
obstructed view during the robbery (R.236,237,243,257,263,267), the 
trial court should have given the requested instruction concerning 
eyewitness identification. The instruction would have been 
mandatory under Long. However, even under the pre-Long 
discretionary standard, the trial court abused its discretion by not 
giving the instruction because of the ambiguities of the 
identification testimony. 
Clearly, here this Court is confronted with a situation 
where a Telfaire type instruction was not only warranted, but quite 
possibly crucial in determining the ultimate outcome of the trial. 
As noted by the State in Jonas, the instruction, if given, would 
have stated "what the jurors ought to look for in a given case to 
determine whether or not the identification is or is not reliable." 
Without the instruction there is a clear possibility that the 
Appellant was denied his presumption of innocence by assigning undue 
weight to the eyewitness testimony. 
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This Court should be especially sensitive to the situation 
given the State's position in Quevedo that "the State cannot really 
come up with a compelling answer why Telfaire ought not be given 
rather routinely in cases that depend to a large extent on 
eyewitness identification." In this case the failure of the trial 
court was particularly prejudicial and warrants reversal. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. 
The Appellant was found guilty at trial of Aggravated 
Robbery, a felony of the first degree under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 
(1953 as amended). He now argues that the State produced 
insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction and now requests a 
reversal of that conviction. 
To convict the Appellant of the crime charged, the 
prosecution must have introduced evidence sufficient to eliminate 
all reasonable doubts as to his inocence from the minds of the 
jurors. This basic standard is codified in Utah Code Ann. 76-1-501 
(1953 as amended), which states: 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed 
to be innocent until each element of the offense 
charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant 
shall be acquitted. 
In State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980), Justice 
Maughan, dissenting, addressed this undisputed standard with regard 
to sufficiency arguments, concluding 
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This standard provides the basis for appellate 
review of a jury's verdict. While it is the sole 
province of the jury to assess the credibility of 
the various witnesses and determine the weight of 
the evidence, this Court must review the 
.sufficiency of the evidence upon which the jury 
bases its final determination. If the evidence 
presented is so lacking that no reasonable person 
could conclude it eliminates all reasonable doubt 
of the defendant's guilt then we must set aside 
the jury verdict. 
Id. at 232. 
Consequently, if there is any reasonable view of the 
credible evidence which is consistent with the Appellant's 
innocence, it would follow that there would be reasonable doubts as 
to his guilt. In this case, since all charges stem from a single 
criminal episode, the prosecution must have proven that on or about 
August 17, 1985, the Appellant either attempted to commit or did 
commit a robbery of Cruser Jewelry and that he did so intentionally 
or knowingly with the use of a deadly weapon. 
This Court has addressed sufficiency of evidence 
requirements on numerous occasions. In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443 (Utah 1983), the Court considered whether there was sufficient 
evidence to sustain a jury conviction of the crime of second degree 
murder. Mr. Petree claimed the State failed to prove he 
"intentionally and knowingly" caused the death of the victim. In 
considering the appropriate standard of review, this Court stated, 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbably that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted, 
(citations omitted) 
Id. at 444. 
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While recognizing that certain deference be granted to the 
jury verdict, the Court nevertheless cautioned that, 
In fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence 
and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the 
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But 
this does not mean that the court can take a 
speculative leap across a remaining gap in order 
to sustain a verdict. The evidence, stretched to 
is utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(citations omitted) 
Id. at 445. In the present case, the failure of the State to prove 
any essential element beyond a reasonable doubt means this Court 
must reverse. State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48,51 (Utah 1983). 
The only substantive evidence against Stephen Kalisz in 
this case is the fact that he returned the car which John Remington 
had originally taken for a test drive (R.172,276-279). However, 
officers at the scene searched Mr. Kalisz and found no stolen 
property (R.283). A search of the vehicle which Mr. Kalisz returned 
also provided no evidence of criminal activity (R.302). Indeed, a 
search of Mr. Kaliszfs residence also produced nothing to implicate 
him in the robbery of Cruserfs jewelry (R.300). 
While the store owner, Reed Cruser, stated that he 
identified Mr. Kalisz shortly after the robbery as the perpetrator 
(R.244-247), an officer at the scene stated unequivocally that no 
such identification was made by Cruser (R.283-284). Cruser stated 
that the robber wore a light blue stocking cap and sweater, tan 
pants, and gym shoes (R.226)j yet within only minutes of the robbery 
and several miles away, officers stated that Mr. Kalisz was dressed 
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in a light blue shirt and blue levis or corduroy pants and was 
wearing boots (R.280). The only other witness who testified to 
seeing either defendant at any time close to the crime testified 
that Mr. Kalisz was not the man she saw (R.215-219). Indeed, Mr. 
Cruser himself later picked a picture of John Remington not Stephen 
Kalisz as the person who robbed the jewelry store (R.326). 
In summary, no substantive evidence produced at trial 
linked Stephen Kalisz to the robbery of Cruser Jewelry. The only 
undisputed evidence linking Mr. Kalisz to the events of August 17, 
1985 concerned his return of the vehicle to the used car lot. This 
evidence can in no way support a conviction for aggravated robbery. 
The Court is left with only speculation as to why Mr. Kalisz was 
convicted and, as this Court has stated, mere speculation is 
insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, 
Stephen Kalisz, asks this Court to reverse his conviction and remand 
his case to the lower court for either dismissal of the charges or a 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this ) y day of September, 1986. 
GARCZA 
Attorney for Appellant 
% . 
MANNY 
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the above Appellant's 
Brief will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this TV* day of 
September, 1986. 
MA&NY GA$CIA 
Attorney for Appellant 
Delivered by this day of 
September, 1986. 
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ADDENDUM A 
T.L. 'TED'" CANtfnv 
County Attorney 
By: DAVID S. WALSH 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN R. REMINGTON DOB 08/26/57, 
STEPHEN J. KALISZ DOB 0*T/17/56, 
Defendant(s). 
Screened by: 
Assigned to: 
D S Walsh 
D S Walsh 
BAIL A§B NO BAIL 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 8 5FS1S0« 
y* 
? 0 
The undersigned Don Bell - SLCPD under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of: 
COUNT i' 
AGGRAVAJED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 1140 Brickyard, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about August 17, 1985, in 
^ violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants, JOHN R. 
REMINGTON and STEPHEN J. KALISZ, as parties to the offense, 
/V unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in the 
3 possession of Reed Cruser from the person or immediate 
presence of Reed Cruser, against his will, by the use of a 
firearm or a facsimile of a firearm; 
y 
COUNT II 
POSSESSION OF 
Degree 
A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a Second 
Felony, at 1140 Brickyard, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, on or about August 17, 1985, in violation of Title 
76, Chapter 10, Section 503, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
the defendant, JOHN R. REMINGTON, a party 
did have in, ''his-
a / firearm, while 
%i 
amended, in that 
to the offense, 
weapon, to-wit: 
State Prison; Of*? 
possession 
an inmate 
a 
at 
dangerous 
the Utah 
;.:/ 
(Continued on page Two) 
- ^ 7 / J 
INFORMATION 
STATE v. JOHN R. REMINGTON and STEPHEN J. 
County Attorney #85-1-67290 
Page Two 
KALISZ 
COUNT III 
POSSESSION 
y 
OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a Second 
Degree Felony, at 1140 Brickyard, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, on or about August 17, 1985, in violation of Title 
76, Chapter 10, Section 503, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, STEPHEN__J_. KALIS.Z. a party 
to the offense, did have in his possession a dangerous 
weapon, to-wit: a firearm, while on parole for a felony; 
COUNT IV 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL, 
of Utah, on 
yy 76, Chapter 
•* amended, in 
a First Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State 
or about August 17, 1985, in vioLation of Title 
8, Section 1001, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
that the defendant, MINGTON, a party 
to the offense, committed the First Degree Felony charged in 
Count I above, and was then and there a person who had been 
twice convicted, sentenced and committed for felony offenses 
at least one of which offenses having been at least a felony 
of the Second Degree, and was committed to prison, to-wit: 
CASE # 
#CR81-332 
CHARGE/DEGREE 
Agg Robbery/lst 
JUDGE/CO 
Judge Dee 
SL Dist Ct 
DATE 
T7TT/81 
SENTENCE 
5 to Life 
#CR31541 
#CR31359 
#CR31541 
*titr 
Theft by 
Deception/3rd 
Assault by 
Prisoner/3rd 
Judge Croft 
SL Dist Ct 
Judge Croft 
SL Dist Ct 
3/20/81 0 to 5 
1-31-78 0 to 5 
NO BAIL REQUEST: The defendant JOHN R. REMINGTON is currently an 
inmate at the Utah State Prison for another felony. Therefore, 
pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Utah Constitution, it is requested 
that the defendant be held without bail on the above charge. 
NO BAIL REQUEST: The 
parole from the Utah 
pursuant to Article I 
defendant STEPHEN J. KALISZ is currently on 
State Prison for another felony. Therefore, 
uuaiii «.u MiLiv-ic ±, Section 8, Utah Constitution, it is requested 
that the defendant be held without bail on the above charge. 
(Continued on page Three) 
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ADDENDUM B 
D I R E C T ttXAMlNA'JL'lUIN 
Q. Would you state your name please sir? 
A. Reed Cruser. 
Q. How do you spell uour last name? 
A. Cruser. 
Q. And where are you employed Mr. Curser? 
A. Sir, my hearing is not the best — I am self-employed. 
Q. As what? 
A. Jeweler and watchmaker. 
Q. Where? 
A, At 1140 East Brickyard Road. 
Q. Is that located here in Salt Lake City? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And within the town. Were you thus employed on or about August 17, 
of this year? 
A. Yes, I was in my store. 
Q. And on that date, a were you held up? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you tell the Court about that please? 
A. It was about 5:30 and I was sitting at my watch bench, I have a 
little bell that rings there but I just didn't hear this man came in 
in a real hurrv and wheeled around the corner and held the gun on me. 
Q. Ok, would you describe to the Judge, that gun please? 
A. A, probably about as near as I could tell it was a black gun and I 
would say as near as I know an automatic and probably 22 or 25 calibur. 
Q. Now do you see that man here in the court today? 
A. Well, I can't say for sure, maybe its dressed different. 
Q. What was the difference in dress ? 
A. Well when he came in he had a I guess they call them the ski maskf 
it was a sweater, it looked like a heavy knit thing that pulls down over 
his head. 
Q. How far over his head? 
A, Well, just above his eyes as near as I could tell. 
Q. Did he speak to you? 
A. Yes, he told me back up there and he said get in here, he was going 
to put me in the restroom, he saya no you get out here and you lay 
down on the floor, 
Q. What happened then? 
A. Well he just cleared out my safe, he asked where the diamonds were 
I told him I didn't have diamonds and a, I asked him if he not take the 
customers repairs I said you won't get anything out of those anyway 
but he just cleaned everything out of the safe; took all the drawers out 
and dumped them in a black plastic bag, went over to one of the show 
casas_and_Jie knew right where the money I had to make change was that 
was the only drawer that he took and a, he scooped watches out of that 
case. 
Q. What kind of watches did he take sir? 
A. Well, there was Boulliva, Carvell, Citizen and my own name on Reeds 
I have (inaudible) 
Q. Where is that located? 
A. There a, I buy these from the East and had my own name put on them 
here ^nd they use that brand name that is done by many jewelers put 
their own name on them, 
Q. How long was he in your store sir? 
A. Well I would say just about three to five minutes. 
Q. Not on tape 
A. I called the police department, I run next door to a man and asked 
him to this guy turned to the right which is the west of the store and 
I run to this man just two doors east and asked him to watch for this 
guy and see if he could get a license plate, but anyway he run to the 
west and then there is an openning there so I am sure he went out that 
way. 
Q. Now the person that you think is that person would you tell us where 
that person is sitting and what he is wearing? 
A. What he is wearing today, now? The man over here kind of was looked 
like, this man is to dark here, his complexion, but tfre man over here 
would look like like him. 
Q. Now were you shown a photospread sir after this? 
A. Would you please repeat? 
Q. Yes sir, were you shown a photospread a, of people by the detectives? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And were you able to pick out the person who did it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How certain were you at that time that the person in the photo you 
identified was the person you — 
A. Well, they took me up to identify the man, they had him in the car 
he was dressed, of conrspf rH ffpfgnt-. h^ h^ H black boots on and I don't 
know-~abau£__the rest of what he was wearing, but it was different, ~~v_ 
the blacJc boots__hacL,heels about 2-2% inches high. 
Q. Where did they take you to do this sir? 
A. Oh let's see I believe it was about 8th South across from Sears 
of somewhere there I think the police have a place there. 
Q. And were you able to identify him at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that the person? 
A. That was the person. 
Q. No further questions your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
Khris Harold's 
Q. Mr. Cruser how long total was this man in your store? 
A. How long was he in the store? 
Q. Yes. Total. 
A. Well I would say just about three to five minutes. 
Q. Ok, how much of that time were you able to look at his face? 
A. Well,„a Little-bit-I- didnft look to much at him because he told me 
to turn around and lay flat on the floor. 
Q. Were you able to ascertain what color his hair was? 
A. It was sort of a brownish rT>lnr_ as near as I could tell. 
Q. What about height sir, what height would you say he was? 
A. Approximately 5'10". 
Q. Could you give me an approximate weight of this individual? 
A. Well, I thought probably 170 lbs. 
Q. Would you describe that as an average size build for a man that 
height? 
A. Well, as far as I know I have never paid too much attention to those 
things. 
Q. Do you recall anything else this individual was wearing beside the 
ski mask or ski hat down just above the eye, anyother article of clothing? 
A. Well, the pants when it was a sort of a tan pants and he had gymn 
shoes on and then the sweater and cap to match which was looked liked 
a knit Jheavy Jsweater ana cap. 
when he spoke to you? 
A. No, not that I can just recall. I thought he first came in a little 
earlier in the day and—a^kad to see some chain, he saw a heavy rope 
chain, which of course, was gold filled and also he mentioned something 
about wanting to buy some watches for a brother-in-law or some relative 
getting married and I showed him a particular one a his and hers, urn 
Citizen watch, but he wanted to look at some others and looked at some 
more expensive numbers I had in the case. 
Q. How much earlier in the day was this? 
A. A, I couldn't say sometime after noon, it was I don't know exactly 
between,_maybe 12:00 and 2:00. I didn't pay too much attention to that 
at that time. 
Q. How was the person dressed at that time? 
A. Well I didn't notice too much in his dress, I didn't have any reason 
to look him over or anything. 
Q. Anything that you recall though, any detail? 
A. Not - I did notice him hawing * fKfarhp and a, this man that came 
in and kind of brown hair. I would say possibly a slim type (fact)not 
heavy or anything that way. 
Q. And how long was he in the store that first time earlier when he 
was looking at your watches? 
A. Oh, very short I don't think over five minutes, he asked me to put 
some of that stuff on Uvawav and he mentioned that the wedding wouldn't 
be for sometime. 
Q. But he didn't actually make any purchases at that time? 
A. No, he asked if he could put it on layaway. 
Q. And then he left? 
A. Oh he was going to bring his wift back. 
Q. I have nothing further. 
Manny Garciafs CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Q. Mr. Cr\iserf is it Cruser? 
A. Cruser, yes 
Q. Now you were taken by the police to a car lot after you were robbed 
and shown somebody is that right? 
A. Well, it was somewhere I thought on South State; I wasn't to sure 
of the location I thought it might be across from Sears, somewhere in 
that — 
Q. But the police took you over there and told you that they had a 
suspect? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you arrived there there was a man there for you to look at? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it this man here? 
A. No I don't think so. 
Q. Have you ever seen this man in the cache outfit here before? 
A. Well, I don't know as TJWP1.1.!^ rQcognise him. 
Q. Ok, but you are sure that he is not the man that they showed you 
at the South State? 
A. -Different—man—I—think. At least the mustache, I can't see whether 
he is wearing one or not. 
Q. Did the robber have a dark mustache? 
A. Yes, Vinr^nf a ^rnwnish mustache to match the hair, 
Q. Can you state with certainity sir, this is-not the man that robbed you? 
This man right here? 
A. As far as I know—cu^ 
Q. Ok, the man that you sawT that the police showed you had on big black 
boots? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at that time did you tell the police that that was the man that 
robbed you? 
A. I said yes< it looks to me like that is the guy, only he is dressed 
different now. 
Q. A, meaning that the boots are different. 
A. The boots, he wore gymn shoes, I had a chance to see those when I 
was laying on the floor, he had me face down but he asked for the diamonds 
and I noticed the pants and the qymn shoes. 
Q. The pants were different sir? 
A. The pants were a light tan, kind of a tan. 
Q. And what color were the robbers pants in the store? 
A. They were tan, well now you asked that question twice now, did you 
mean in the store? 
Q. Well, ok the man that you saw, the police showed you to, the man 
at the car lot with the boots on, were the pants he had on different 
then than the pants — 
A. I think they were, I didn't notice that too much, but I did nnt-ir^ 
the boots there he has on. 
Q. When this man pulled that ski mask over his head you could still see 
his eyes couldn't you? 
A. Well, I think he come in he didn't have it, he had it pulled down 
when he come in enough to hide his hair, his head. 
Q. But could you see his^eye"^?) 
A. I didn't notice that. 
Q. Ok, did you notice any/ marks or tatoos or anything on him? 
Q. Did a, this man that you went two doors and asked if he saw anything 
did he say that he saw anybody? 
A. No, he a I guess he run around the corner I haven't talked to him--
too much about that but I am sure he didn't because he went the other 
way, I thought possibly he might have a car parked down there but I'm 
sure when he went out to the west and then oh another 100 ft. or so 
there is another openning there to the west so I assume that that is the 
way he went out. 
Q. Did you go out that door? 
A. I didn't go because I called the police and waited and locked up the 
door so no one could get in and disturb any evidence. 
Q. Ok, did this robber have gloves on ? 
A. Didn't notice any gloves. 
Q. Ok, urn, what parts of your store did he touch besides the jewelery 
case? 
A. Well the safe and the jewelery case and the windows. 
Q. Ok, Now you are quite certain then that you told the police that 
the man they were showing you on the Street was the man who robbed you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you a>re saying now that it was certainly not this man? 
A. Well, I couldn't say, the build is about right. 
Q. What about the mustache? 
A. Well, he had a mustache, I believe, at first I didn't know, but then 
when I got to th inkin I connected t h i s with the^^iLJLii-ja.arliRr -in.JJie 
s t o r e , he did have a mustache, i t seemed l ike darker than what I see 
t he re . 
Q. Ok, and the difference in the clothing? 
A. Well, I didn't notice too much about the clothing I was more intereste 
in looking at his face and then I did notice the boots that he had on 
he wasn't dressed that way. 
Q. Ok, I believe that is all I have. 
ADDENDUM C 
1 THE C O U R T : WE DON'T WANT MR. GARCIA TO 
2 BE MI S 1 DEIITI FIED A G A I N . 
3 MR. GAR C I A : THANK' YOU. 
4 Q (BY MS. HARROLD) WHEN HE BROUGHT THE 
5 P H O T O G R A P H S IN, DO YOU RECALL WHAT HE SAID? 
6 A HE SAID, LOOK AT T H E S E . SOMETIMES YOU 
7 WON'T BE SURE AND SO M E T I M E S YOU WILL BE S U R E . TELL 
8 ME WHAT YOU THINK . 
9 Q WAS THERE ANY INDICATION WITH ANY OF THESE 
10 GENTLEMEN WHOSE PICTURES WERE SHOWN OF HOW TALL THEY 
11 MIGHT HAVE BEEN? 
12 A NO . 
13 Q DID ALL OF THESE G E N T L E M E N HAVE M U S T A C H E S ? 
14 A NOT THAT I CAN R E C A L L , BUT MOST OF THEM 
15 DID . 
16 Q DO YOU KNOW HOW MANY? 
17 A NO . 
18 Q WOULD YOU MIND LOOKING THROUGH THOSE NOW 
19 AND TELL ME HOW MANY HAVE M U S T A C H E S ? 
20 A S U R E . ALL OF THEM DO. 
21 0 HOW MANY OF THOSE G E N T L E M E N IN THOSE 
22 PHOTOS HAVE S U N G L A S S E S ON? 
23 A NONE OF THEM. 
24 Q ARE THOSE ALL DIRECT S H O T S ? IN OTHER 
25 W O R D S , ARE THEY LOOKING RIGHT AT THE CAMERA? 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 53 
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1 BUILD AS THE ROBBER? 
2 A PRETTY NEAR. I WOULD SAY PRETTY NEAR. 
3 Q A SLIM PERSON? 
4 I A S I R ? 
5 Q A SLIM PERSON? 
6 A WELL, WASN'T REAL HEAVY SET, NO. 
7 Q SO, DO YOU REMEMBER AT THE PRELIMINARY 
8 HEARING WHEN YOU WERE MAKING IDENTIFICATIONS THAT 
9 YOU, IN FACT, IDENTIFIED ME? 
10 A SIR? 
11 Q DO YOU REMEMBER IDENTIFYING ME AT THE 
12 I PRELIMINARY HEARING WHEN YOU WERE ASKED IF YOU SAW 
13 THE ROBBER? 
14 A NOT THAT I RECALL. 
15 Q DO YOU REMEMBER SAYING THE MAN IN THE 
16 LIGHT BROWN SUIT? 
17 A I DON'T KNOW THAT I MENTIONED JT AT ALL. 
18 Q HOW MUCH DO YOU THINK I WEIGH, SIR? 
19 A WELL, YOU ARE PRETTY NEAR -- I WOULD 160 
20 OR 70, JUST A GUESS. 
21 Q DID THIS ROBBER WALK IN WITH THAT PLASTIC 
22 BAG IN HI S HANDS? 
23 A I DIDN'T NOTICE THAT UNTIL HE WENT OUT. 
24 Q DID YOU SEE WHERE HE WENT? 
25 A I KNEW HE WAS FILLING SOMETHING THERE 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. g
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ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. In this case its value depends on 
the opportunity the witness had to observe whether or not the 
defendant was the person who is charged with the alleged 
crime. 
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, 
you should consider the following: 
1. Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity 
and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe 
the person at the time will be affected by such matters as how 
long or short a time was available, how far or close the witness 
was from the offender, how good were lighting conditions, 
whether the witness had had occasion to see or know the person 
in the past. 
2. Are you satisfied that the identification made by that 
witness subsequent to the event was a product of his or her 
own recollection? You may take into account both the strength 
of the identification, and the circumstances under which the 
identification was made. 
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced 
by the circumstances under which the defendant was presented 
to him for identification, you should scrutinize the identification 
with great care. You may also consider the length of time that 
lapsed between the occurence of the crime and the next 
opportunity of the witness to see defendant, as a factor beari^ g.N* 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Page 2 
on the reliability of the identification. 
3. Finally, you must consider the credibility of each 
identification witness in the same way as any other witness, 
consider whether he is truthful, and consider whether he had 
the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observation 
on the matter covered in his testimony. 
The burden of proof on the State extends to every element 
of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is such an 
element. The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
John R. Remington was the perpetrator of the offense. If 
after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as 
the accuracy of the identification you must find the defendant 
not guilty. 
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